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CHRISTOPHER W. PETERSON* 
Piercing the Corporate Veil by Tort Creditors 
The long-standing equitable remedy of piercing the corporate veil has evolved 
over the past century as courts have become cognizant of the costs to society of 
limited liability. Over the last few decades, many courts have acknowledged a 
distinction between the justifications for piercing the veil by a tort creditor and those 
for a contract creditor. Nearly all such courts that have acknowledged the distinction 
have concluded that tort creditors should have an easier path to piercing the 
corporation’s veil of limited liability. 
This Article reviews the tests courts are increasingly using to grant leniency to 
tort creditors and the justifications that are most likely to predict veil piercing 
success by such creditors. This Article concludes that courts tend to use the same veil 
piercing test for both contract and tort creditors, but re-weigh the factors that are 
influential in predicting such veil-piercing outcomes. Courts tend to focus on the 
equitable nature of the veil piercing remedy and on the policy considerations unique 
to tort creditors in re-weighing the veil-piercing factors in favor of tort creditors. 
According to the prevailing jurisprudential trend, tort creditors are granted an 
easier path to veil piercing because of the policy considerations that tort victims 
should not be required to bear the costs of risky corporate behavior when they 
neither chose to deal with the corporation nor had the opportunity to protect 
themselves from the risk of corporate insolvency. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Considered the hallmark of corporate status, limited liability shields an investor’s 
personal assets from the reach of a business entity’s creditors, reducing the investor’s 
personal exposure.1 Limited liability has many benefits.2 It allows business entities 
to aggregate large amounts of capital from numerous small investors, many of whom 
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 1.  See David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited 
Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1309 (2007). 
 2.  Id. at 1312–1313. 
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would be reluctant to risk their personal wealth if there was a possibility of being 
held liable for substantial corporate obligations.3 It allows investors to hold 
diversified portfolios in a number of companies without exposing themselves to 
ruin.4 “Limited liability therefore encourages investment that otherwise would not 
occur.”5 Moreover, for the rest of society, the increase in capital and business activity 
increases employment and wages.6 
Despite its myriad of benefits, limited liability is not without its costs.7 When a 
business entity invokes the principles of limited liability, it typically means that some 
other party is bearing costs.8 These costs impact both parties that voluntarily contract 
with business entities and individuals who involuntarily become creditors of business 
entities.9 One category of costs stems from the imperfect information available to 
parties deciding whether to engage in a contractual relationship with a business entity 
protected by limited liability.10 Contracting parties may not accurately gauge the 
risks of transacting business with a company, either because of misrepresentations 
made by such company or because of lack of access to credit reports and other 
information about the company.11 Additionally, a stark imbalance in bargaining 
power often precludes the contracting party from obtaining the information needed 
to gauge such risk.12 The same imbalance in bargaining power also precludes the 
contracting party from negotiating, for example, guarantees from the shareholders or 
security interests in the company or shareholder’s assets.13 
 
 3.  Id. at 1312. 
 4.  See Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 
96 (1985). 
 5.  Millon, supra note 1, at 1312. 
 6.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 97 (expounding upon the many advantages of limited 
liability for companies and society as a whole). 
 7.  See generally id. (discussing the costs and benefits of limited liability). 
 8.  See id. at 103–04; see also Rachel Maizes, Limited Liability Companies: A Critique, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 575, 600 (1996) (detailing the various other parties that bear the costs). 
 9.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 103–04; see also Maizes, supra note 8, at 600 . 
 10.  See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 632–33 (1979) (explaining that one justification for legal 
intervention is that consumers cannot contract in their own interest without the data to rank purchase options in 
the market); see generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 106 (noting that voluntary creditors may not 
have the information or incentive to assess risk correctly). 
 11.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 112. But see Roger E. Meiners, James S. Mofsky, & Robert 
D. Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 362–63 (1979) (suggesting that 
investments in a corporation would not dramatically change even if there was unlimited liability). 
 12.  See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil: Is the Common Law the Problem, 37 CONN. L. REV. 619, 
628 (2005) [hereinafter Thompson, Is the Common Law the Problem]. 
 13.  See 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 41.85 (2017) 
(stating that sometimes contracting parties are not experienced enough to negotiate adequately with a company 
and noting that in those instances courts will regard contract and tort creditors in the same way). 
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Limited liability also creates a problem of moral hazard.14 When a company is not 
required to pay for the risks created by its actions, the company will be more likely 
to engage in activities with social costs that exceed their social benefits.15 This is 
particularly true in the case of involuntary creditors such as certain tort creditors, 
trade creditors, and employees.16 These parties are not compensated for the increased 
risky behavior of the company.17 
Recognizing these costs, courts have carved out certain exceptions to limited 
liability.18 In an effort to reduce excessive corporate risk-taking and to compensate 
certain creditors for increased risk, under certain circumstances, courts of equity 
allow such creditors to reach beyond the four corners of the company’s balance sheet 
to the assets of investors and affiliated companies.19 In other words, the court may 
allow a creditor to pierce the corporate veil.20 
However, the law regarding corporate veil piercing is notoriously murky.21 Courts 
rely on equitable principles in balancing the need to protect the benefits of limited 
liability with the desire to curb corporate fraud, misrepresentation, and other 
wrongdoing and to protect involuntary creditors from recognizing the costs of the 
company’s risky behavior.22 Traditionally, this balancing has led to results that 
appear unquestionably confusing and incoherent;23 indeed, it has become cliché to 
reference the countless ways commentators and courts have described the absolutely 
unpredictable nature of the veil-piercing doctrine.24 
 
 14.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 104. 
 15.  Id. at 112. 
 16.  See Millon, supra note 1, at 1355. 
 17.  See id. (discussing the social costs imposed on involuntary creditors who must seek a judgment after 
the incident has occurred, and sometimes will be left to bear the cost themselves). 
 18.  See generally Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573 (1986) 
(discussing the development of limited liability in the history of American Law and the judicial decisions to begin 
to recognize exceptions to that rule). 
 19.  See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 
1044–45 (1990-1991) (listing a variety of reasons offered by judges as to why they decided to pierce the corporate 
veil in certain cases) [hereinafter Thompson, An Empirical Study]. 
 20.  See id. at 1036 (explaining what piercing the corporate veil means in general terms). 
 21.  See Cathy S. Krendt & James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DENV. 
L.J. 1, 7 (1978). 
 22.  See Thompson, Is the Common Law the Problem, supra note 12, at 628 (suggesting that courts will 
often provide a remedy for involuntary creditors who are hurt by fraud and other risky business practices). 
 23.  Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real Justifications for 
Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 101 (2014). 
 24.  See, e.g., Amfac Foods, Inc. v. Int’l Sys. & Controls Corp., 654 P.2d 1092, 1097 (Or. 1982) (“Many 
judicial opinions contain alluring but largely unhelpful rhetorical devices which purport to state a rule, but 
generally state merely a result.”); ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 38 (1986) (describing veil piercing as 
“intellectually disturbing”); Sam Halabi, Veil Piercing’s Procedure, 67 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 1001, 1026 (2015); 
Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81, 84 (2010); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 89 (describing 
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Despite the confusion that exists with general veil-piercing law, there is one 
emerging trend that business leaders should be aware of: courts are increasingly 
granting one group of creditors an easier path to the assets of investors and 
affiliates—involuntary tort creditors.25 The classic example is the uninsured and 
insolvent transportation company whose driver negligently slams into the back of an 
unsuspecting individual, resulting in significant and life-altering injuries.26 Although 
the company created the risk that resulted in the individual’s injuries, unless the 
corporate veil is pierced, it will not bear the costs of such risk, which will instead be 
shifted to the injured individual, who neither chose to associate with the company 
nor had an opportunity to obtain compensation or other protections from the 
company’s owners before getting injured.27 
Increasingly, courts are finding that the equities weigh in favor of piercing the 
corporate veil for injured tort victims.28 Commentators have long distinguished the 
varied policy justifications for piercing the corporate veil in voluntary contract cases 
and involuntary tort cases.29 However, courts have been slow to recognize such a 
distinction,30 with most of those courts that have acknowledged the distinction doing 
so only within the last 30 years.31 Furthermore, although commentators have 
acknowledged that courts are more willing to disregard the corporate veil in the tort 
 
veil piercing as “freakish” and comparing it to lightning because it is “rare, severe, and unprincipled”); Millon, 
supra note 1, at 1311 (describing veil piercing as “incoherent” and is an “unprincipled hodgepodge of seemingly 
ad hoc and unpredictable results”). 
 25.  See Oh, supra note 24, at 90. But see Thompson, An Empirical Study, supra note 19 at 1058 (concluding 
that contract creditors are more likely than tort creditors to be able to pierce the corporate veil). 
 26.  See, e.g., Giuffria v. Red River Barge Lines, Inc., 452 So.2d 793, 794 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming 
the trial court’s determination to pierce the corporate veil where an uninsured and insolvent transportation 
company’s diver negligently hit the plaintiff’s van). 
 27.  See Millon, supra note 1, at 1316. 
 28.  See Oh, supra note 24, at 141–43 (distinguishing voluntary and involuntary creditors and success on 
veil-piercing claims and the rationales used by courts to justify piercing the veil). 
 29.  See, e.g., Theberge v. Darbro, Inc., 684 A.2d 1298, 1303 (Me. 1996) (Lipez, J., dissenting) (explaining 
the court adopted the position that contract claimants trying to pierce the corporate veil must meet a more 
stringent standard of proof than tort creditors); William O. Douglas & Carol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability 
Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.R. 193, 210–11 (1929) (discussing the difficulties faced by 
contract creditors compared to tort creditors in piercing the corporate veil). 
 30.  See Theberge, 684 A.2d at 1303 n.1 (Lipez, J., dissenting); H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 143, 
146 (1961); Michael Epperson & Joan M. Canny, The Capital Shareholder’s Ultimate Calamity: Pierced 
Corporate Veils and Shareholder Liability in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, 37 CATH. U.L. 
REV. 605, 633–34 (1988); Robert W. Hamilton, Comment, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 985 
(1971) (noting that the distinction between tort and contract is only dimly perceived by many courts). 
 31.  Although the distinction could certainly have been discussed by courts, the Author did not find such 
distinction to regularly appear in appellate court cases until the mid-1980s. 
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context,32 the most influential studies have not analyzed the tests courts use to 
achieve these results.33 
This Article provides a comprehensive comparison of how courts treat 
involuntary tort creditors relative to voluntary contract creditors and concludes that 
although most courts use the same test in tort and contract cases, they apply the test 
differently, and are more likely to allow tort creditors to pierce the corporate veil. 
Furthermore, courts should be more lenient in piercing the corporate veil for tort 
creditors because such creditors are truly unable to protect themselves from the 
inefficient harms of businesses. Part II reviews the doctrine of veil piercing, 
generally, as an equitable remedy and the policy reasons behind disregarding a 
business entity to reach the assets of the equity investors or other related entities. Part 
III discusses the distinction between tort and contract creditors and the economic 
considerations for piercing the veil in each such case. Part IV analyzes the various 
ways in which courts have treated tort creditors differently from contract creditors, 
and identifies how courts are in fact making it easier for tort creditors to pierce the 
veil by focusing on persuasive policy justifications unique to such creditors. Part V 
concludes that courts across the country applying different veil piercing tests reach 
the same conclusion with respect to tort creditors due to public policy concerns. 
II. VEIL PIERCING, GENERALLY 
Under the doctrine of limited liability, investors in a corporation, LLC or other 
separate entity, are only liable for the amount they invested and not liable for all 
obligations of the business entity.34 The justification for this basic concept of 
corporate law is that these entities “are distinct juridical entities separate and apart 
from their creditors, shareholders, directors, and other constituencies.”35 As a 
judicially-created equitable remedy, veil piercing represents the circumstances under 
which a creditor may disregard the separate entity and force equity investors and 
other related parties to satisfy the entity’s debts.36 
 
 32.  See, e.g., 1 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 13, § 41.85; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 112 
(“Courts are more willing to disregard the corporate veil in tort than in contract cases”); Oh, supra note 24, at 90 
(“[V]eil-piercing claims prevail more often in Tort than Contract, reversing the counterintuitive asymmetry found 
by Thompson’s study.”). But see Thompson, An Empirical Study, supra note 19, 1058 (concluding that courts 
pierce less often in tort than in contract contexts). Thompson’s conclusions have been upended by Peter Oh’s 
2010 study, concluding that courts are more likely to pierce the veil in tort than in contract.  See generally Oh, 
supra note 24. 
 33.  See Halabi, supra note 24, at 1033. 
 34.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 89–90. 
 35.  See Macey & Mitts, supra note 23, at 104. 
 36.  See Jonathan A. Marcantel, Because Judges are Not Angels Either: Limiting Judicial Discretion by 
Introducing Objectivity into Piercing Doctrine, 59 KAN. L. REV. 191, 195 (2010). 
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One justification for veil piercing is that a business entity should be held liable for 
insufficient management and oversight.37 However, this justification extends only to 
shareholders of close corporations, where ownership of the business entity is more 
closely tied to its management.38 Conversely, the argument for limited liability is 
more compelling for shareholders of publicly held companies, for whom monitoring 
of management is generally not feasible or cost effective.39 Such shareholders 
“manage risk by investing passively in a diversified portfolio of companies rather 
than attempting actively to involve themselves in management of one or a few 
companies.”40 
A. Veil Piercing is an Equitable Remedy 
It is imperative to note, first and foremost, that a request to pierce the corporate veil 
is equitable in nature, and as such, is accompanied by all the characteristics of 
equitable jurisprudence.41 Equity, in a broad sense, is “the power to do justice in a 
particular case by exercising discretion to mitigate the rigidity of strict legal rules.”42 
It is “individualized justice,” or the power to adapt the relief to the circumstances of 
the particular case.43 Equitable relief has always been subject to the discretion of the 
court, as opposed to a matter of right.44 
Judicial discretion in equity is not, however, absolute.45 Although granted 
significant discretion to “do justice” in a particular case, courts of equity are still 
constrained by well-settled principles that govern the circumstances under which 
such justice may be prescribed.46 While equity has been criticized for being too 
flexible,47 in reality, judges acting in equity lack the power to grant relief based 
simply upon principles of compassion and fairness.48 
 
 37.  See Macey & Mitts supra note 23, at 127. 
 38.  See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close Corporations Reconsidered, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1169 (1988-1989). 
 39.  See Millon, supra note 1, at 1314. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  See All Star, Inc. v. Fellows, 676 S.E.2d 808, 813 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). 
 42.  See Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable Remedies and Principled Discretion: The Michigan Experience, 74 
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 609, 609 (1997). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 613. 
 45.  Id. at 616. 
 46.  Id. at 616–23 (elaborating on the established principles governing a court of equity). 
 47.  Id. at 613 (“From equity’s earliest days, one can find biting criticisms about the flexibility of equity, 
probably the most famous of these being John Selden’s indictment that the chancellor’s conscience varied with 
the length of his foot.”). 
 48.  See Spoon-Shacket Co. v. City of Oakland, 97 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Mich. 1959). 
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As an equitable remedy, veil piercing is also subject to the established principles 
and maxims of equity.49 Several of these maxims especially applicable to veil 
piercing include the following: (1) equitable relief is available only where there is no 
adequate remedy at law; (2) equity regards as done which ought to be done; (3) equity 
looks to the intent, rather than to the form; (4) equitable relief is extraordinary, not 
ordinary; and (5) equity only helps those who have done everything to help 
themselves.50 
1. No Adequate Remedy at Law 
A prerequisite to the granting of any equitable remedy is that there be “no adequate 
remedy at law.”51 A plaintiff’s legal remedy is usually deemed inadequate if the 
plaintiff could have or already did recover a money judgment from the defendant, 
but the judgment is uncollectible because the defendant is insolvent.52 A corollary to 
this maxim is the principle that wherever a legal right has been infringed, a remedy 
will be given.53 If the law is not able to provide an adequate remedy, then equity steps 
in to provide the remedy.54 
2. Equity Regards as Done Which Ought to be Done 
Equity treats as done that “which in good conscience ought to be done.”55 It applies 
to every case where an affirmative equitable duty to do some positive act devolves 
 
 49.  See, e.g., Drury Dev. Corp. v. Found. Ins. Co., 668 S.E.2d 798, 800 (S.C. 2008) (“In general, equitable 
principles govern the veil piercing remedy.”); All Star, Inc., 676 S.E.2d at 813 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (“The concept 
of piercing the corporate veil is based upon equitable principles.”) (quoting Pantusco v. Wiley, 616 S.E.2d 901 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2005)). 
 50.  See generally Kennedy, supra note 42; see also 1 CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR., MODERN EQUITY: 
COMMENTARIES ON MODERN EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS DETERMINED BY THE COURTS AND STATUTES OF 
ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES § 54 (1892); 27 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 69:34 (4th ed. 2003); Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA 
L. REV. 530, 582 (2016) (referencing a number of equitable maxims). 
 51.  See Bray, supra note 50, at 580 (“For an equitable remedy to be given, there must be ‘no adequate 
remedy at law.’ That requirement applies to all claims for equitable remedies.”); see also Halabi, supra note 24, 
at 1029 (stating that veil piercing, as an equitable remedy, should only be available where there is no adequate 
legal remedy). 
 52.  See, e.g., In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Empl. Practices Litig., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1120 (D. Nev. 
2007) (“[D]amages may be inadequate . . . when the defendant is insolvent . . . .”); Harris v. Krekler, 46 N.E.2d 
267, 269 (Ind. Ct. App. 1949) (noting insolvency of the defendant as an instance when the legal remedy is 
inadequate); Kennedy, supra note 42, at 649. Some courts require the plaintiff to obtain a judgment at law and 
then show that the defendant is insolvent and the judgment is uncollectible before the remedy at law will be 
considered inadequate, as opposed to immediately requesting equitable relief before a judgment at law has been 
obtained. See, e.g., Weinstein v. Aisenberg, 758 So.2d 705, 709 (Fla. App. 2000). 
 53.  1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 423 (4th 1918). 
 54.  See Bray, supra note 50, at 580. 
 55.  POMEROY, supra note 53, § 364. 
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upon one party, and a corresponding equitable right is held by another party.56 
Pomeroy, in his ageless treatise on equity and equitable remedies, noted that equity 
is able to treat as done which ought to be done by looking past the form to the intent57 
to get to the “real fact, the real beneficial truth” in order to make “its remedies more 
complete.”58 
3. Equity Looks to Intent, Rather Than Form 
In looking past the external form of a transaction, equity seeks to determine the 
underlying substance, and to ascertain the rights and duties of the parties which 
spring from the real relations between such parties.59 Equity “will never suffer the 
mere appearance and external form to conceal the true purposes, objects and 
consequences of a transaction.”60 Instead, it “disregards names, and penetrates 
disguises to get at the substance beneath.”61 With regard to piercing the veil, a court 
of equity “will examine the whole transaction, looking through corporate forms to 
the substance of things, to protect the rights of innocent parties.”62 
4. Equitable Relief is Extraordinary 
It is well-established that an equitable remedy is an extraordinary, as opposed to 
ordinary, form of relief.63 As applied to veil piercing, the equitable remedy “‘exists 
as a last resort, where there is no other adequate and available remedy to repair the 
plaintiff’s injury.’”64 Courts are “extremely reluctant” to pierce the veil without 
“exceptional circumstances” to support such an extraordinary remedy.65 
5. Equity Only Helps Those Who Have Done Everything to Help Themselves 
Finally, equity will not interfere on behalf of one who had an opportunity to prevent 
an injury by due diligence but failed to do so.66 For example, in the case of fraud, if 
 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. § 378. 
 58.  Id. §365. 
 59.  Id.§ 378. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Spencer v. Letland, 59 So. 593, 594 (Ala. 1912) (citing JAMES W. EATON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE, 83 (1901)). 
 62.  Medlock v. Medlock, 642 N.W.2d 113, 126 (Neb. 2002) (quotation marks omitted). 
 63.  Sorenson v. Pyeatt, 146 P.3d 1172, 1176 (Wash. 2006) (citing HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF 
THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 22, at 47 (2d ed. 1948)). 
 64.  Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enters., 397 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Amfac 
Foods, Inc. v. Int’l Systems & Controls Corp., 654 P.2d 1092, 1098 (1982)). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See, e.g., Marcantel, supra note 36, at 200 n. 48. 
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the person relying on such misrepresentation had an opportunity to protect himself 
prospectively by engaging in self-help, equity can do nothing.67 
B. The Veil-Piercing Prongs 
Veil piercing law began as a direct application of established equitable maxims and 
principles,68 but has since sprouted various state-specific tests to assist courts in 
furtherance of their equitable objectives.69 Although there is some variation, courts 
generally require plaintiffs to satisfy two prongs in order to pierce the corporate veil: 
a “formalities” prong and a “fairness” prong.70 The formalities prong, which has also 
been referred to as the control,71 alter ego,72 or unity of interest prong,73 requires a 
showing of such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the 
corporation, LLC, or other separate entity, and of the individual shareholder(s) no 
longer exist.74 The fairness prong generally requires a showing of fraud, illegality, 
injustice, inequity, or some other wrongdoing by the entity.75 
The formalities prong is typically assessed through the lens of a number of factors 
used to help the court determine whether a sufficient unity of interest exists such that 
 
 67.  See Marcantel, supra note 36, at 200 (explaining that courts would exercise less equity jurisdiction in 
contract cases since parties to a contract theoretically can engage “in self-help prospectively”). 
 68.  See supra Part II.A. 
 69.  See generally Sam F. Halbi, Veil-Piercing’s Procedure, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1001 (2015) (discussing 
the various veil piercing procedures used by courts across the United States). 
 70.  See, e.g., Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 99 (W.V. 1986) (citing Automotriz del Golfo de 
California S. A. de C. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1951)); Tower Inv’r, LLC v. 111 E. Chestnut Consultants, 
Inc., 864 N.E.2d 927 (Ill. App. 2007); D’Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 147 P.3d 515, 522 (Utah App. 2006) (“Courts 
have referred to the first prong of the alter ego test as the ‘formalities requirement,’ . . . Courts term the second 
prong the ‘fairness requirement’”); Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 96–99 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Harvey 
Gelb, Piercing the Corporate Veil - The Undercapitalization Factor, 59 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1, 2 n.10 (1982). 
Cases may also have a third, wrongdoing prong. See, e.g., Phillips v. Englewood Post No. 322 Veterans of 
Foreign Wars of the U.S., Inc., 139 P.3d 639, 644 (Colo. 2006), However, this is often made part of the second 
fairness prong. See, e.g., Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979). At least 
one court has, on occasion, allowed plaintiffs to pierce the veil upon satisfying only one of the two prongs. See 
Phillip R. Strauss, Control and/or Misconduct: Clarifying the Test for Piercing the Corporate Veil in Alaska, 9 . 
ALA L.R. 65, 69 n.21 (1992) (listing Alaska cases that use a “disjunctive” test allowing plaintiffs to pierce the 
veil upon a showing of either of the prongs). 
 71.  See, e.g., Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538, 543 (Ohio 2008). 
 72.  See, e.g., Perpetual Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Michaelson Props., Inc., 974 F.2d 545, 548 (4th Cir. 
1992); Phillips, 139 P.3d at 644. 
 73.  See, e.g., Automotriz del Golfo de California S. A. de C., 306 P.2d at 3. 
 74.  See, e.g., Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 99; Automotriz del Golfo de California S. A. de C., 306 P.2d at 3; 
Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 543. 
 75.  See Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 543 (discussing fraud or illegality, and injustice); Automotriz del Golfo 
de California S. A. de C., 306 P.2d at 3 (discussing inequality); Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 99 (discussing inequality); 
Phillips, 139 P.3d at 644 (discussing fraud, defeat a rightful claim, shareholder impropriety). 
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the business entity has no separate mind or will of its own.76 These factors, although 
generally not presented as an exclusive and definitive list,77 can include as many as 
nineteen different considerations.78 Such considerations include whether funds and 
assets are commingled, the adequacy and maintenance of corporate records, the 
nature and form of the entity’s ownership and control, whether the business is 
undercapitalized, the use of the corporation as a “mere shell,” the disregard of legal 
formalities, and the use of corporate funds or assets for noncorporate purposes.79 
Courts provide little direction as to how the factors “are to be weighted or which ones 
are necessary or sufficient by themselves to support a piercing result.”80 One 
commentator likened these factors to an “unweighted laundry list that results in 
inherent vagueness . . ., giv[ing] the cases an ad hoc, fluky aspect.”81 
Even if a complaining party is able to show that the defendant shareholder had 
complete control over the corporation and that the entity was the alter ego of the 
shareholder, courts will generally also identify what is blameworthy about the 
defendant’s use of that control.82 The fairness prong looks to the fundamental issue 
of fairness under the facts and asks whether an inequitable result will occur if the 
business entity is not pierced.83 The essence of this prong is that an investor cannot 
be allowed to “‘hide from the normal consequences of carefree entrepreneuring by 
doing so through a corporate shell.’”84 Courts generally require a showing of some 
wrongdoing, such as fraud, illegality, inequity, or injustice.85 Fraud, in this context 
and when required by such state’s veil piercing law, is used more generally to mean 
bad faith or unfairness, rather than deliberate dishonesty designed to induce 
 
 76.  See United States ex rel. Landis v. Tailwind Sports Corp., 51 F. Supp. 3d 9, 62 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 77.  See, e.g., Cent. Bus. Forms, Inc. v. N-Sure Sys., Inc., 540 So. 2d 1029 (La. App. 1989) (“Proof of some 
factors tending to support the alter ego theory may not result in individual liability if the theory is negated by the 
totality of the facts and circumstances, including the creditor’s willingness to contract with the debtor corporation 
as an entity distinct from its stockholders.”); see infra Part II.C. 
 78.  See, e.g., Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 98 (noting 19 factors to be considered); Phillips, 139 P.3d at 644 (stating 
8 factors to be considered); Evans v. Multicon Constr. Corp., 574 N.E.2d 395, 398 (Mass. App. 1991) (noting 12 
factors for consideration). 
 79.  In re Phillips v. Englewood Post No. 322 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Inc., 139 P.3d 
639, 644 (Colo. 2006). 
 80.  Millon, supra note 1, at 1327. 
 81.  Id. at 1330. This unweighted laundry list requires “‘courts to balance many imponderables, all important 
but none dispositive and frequently lacking in a common metric to boot.’” Id. (quoting Judge Easterbrook in 
Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 414 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
 82.  See id. at 1333. 
 83.  Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 84.  Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 102 (W.V. 1986) (quoting Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 
F.2d 92, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
 85.  Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Greater Kan. City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1052 (10th Cir. 1993). 
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reliance.86 Requiring plaintiffs to satisfy all the elements of a civil fraud claim would 
negate the need for veil piercing relief in the first place.87 Notwithstanding the messy 
nature88 of the veil piercing prongs, commentators agree that courts generally arrive 
at the correct result.89 
C. Totality of the Circumstances 
Although significant emphasis has been placed on the formalities prong factors,90 the 
test used by courts to determine whether a sufficient unity of interest exists (i.e. 
whether the formalities prong has been satisfied) is more accurately described as a 
totality of the circumstances test, not a factor test.91 A true factor test “explicitly 
limits relevancy, thereby partially constraining future judicial discretion and making 
the law more predictable.”92 In other words, factor tests limit a judge’s discretion to 
a consideration and balancing of a certain closed set of factors.93 This allows for more 
 
 86.  Million, supra note 1, at 334. This is also referred to as “constructive fraud.” See Castleberry v. 
Barnscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986), superseded by statute, TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 2.21 (West 
2010) (expired), as recognized in SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 455 (Tex. 
2008) (“Actual fraud usually involves dishonesty of purpose or intent to deceive, whereas constructive fraud is 
the breach of some legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent because 
of its tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to injure public interests.”).  
 87.  See Millon, supra note 1, at 1334. 
 88.  See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 70, at 89.   
 89.  See Thompson, An Empirical Study, supra note 19, at 1037 (“[M]any believe that beneath this layer of 
unhelpful language courts are getting it right.”); Macey and Mitts, supra note 23, at 103 (noting that in the context 
of veil piercing decisions, judges “generally reach the correct results”); Glenn G. Morris, Piercing the Corporate 
Veil in Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 271, 272 (1991) (“[R]egardless of their varying explanations of the actual 
results that they see, most commentators also seem to share the faith that what actually does happen in these cases 
is, for the most part, what ought to happen.”). 
 90.  See Macey & Mitts, supra note 23, at 106–07 (“A sure sign of the state of confusion in this area of law 
is the existence of incoherent and inconsistent multifactored tests.”). 
 91.  See Aron Bookman, Transcending Common Law Principles of Limited Liability of Parent Corporations 
for the Environment, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 555, 575–76 (1999). Although factors are used, the court will look to 
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the two prongs have been met. See id. (discussing that 
although courts look to a variety of factors, “piercing the corporate veil becomes a totality of the circumstances 
test”). The use of factors by courts has led some commentators to describe the test as a factor test. See, e.g., 
Marcantel, supra note 36, at 196–97 (“[M]ost states have settled for a factors test, permitting trial courts to 
consider, ignore, and weigh various factors as the situation necessitates.”). However, as courts have noted, the 
factors, although influential, are only a starting point and courts have the ability to (and often do) consider 
additional facts and circumstances in making veil piercing decisions. See infra Part IV. 
 92.  James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line Balancing Test Continuum, 27 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 800 (1995). 
 93.  Id. For a true factor test, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976), where the Supreme 
Court lists the only three, distinct factors that can be considered when determining the amount of process “due” 
a particular claimant under the Due Process Clauses. 
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predictability because parties are not concerned with considerations outside of such 
factors. 
A totality of the circumstances test, on the other hand, assesses all known and 
relevant information and “is an examination of [an issue] in the light of all known 
and conceivable circumstances, excluding nothing and giving no one fact, action, or 
condition a controlling influence upon the assessment.”94 In the context of veil 
piercing, a court must at least review the various factors enumerated in prior cases, 
but also has the liberty of considering all other “known and conceivable 
circumstances.”95 
The Utah Supreme Court aptly explained this idea when deciding whether to 
adopt certain factors used by the state’s Court of Appeals.96 In Jones & Trevor 
Marketing. v. Lowry, the plaintiff asserted certain tort and contract claims, together 
with a request to pierce the corporate veil.97 In reviewing the veil piercing request, 
the Court adopted the eight factors enumerated by the Court of Appeals in Colman 
v. Colman.98 However, in adopting the factors, the Court emphasized the non-
exclusive nature of such factors in the veil-piercing analysis: 
 Courts have considered a wide variety of factors in determining 
whether to pierce the corporate veil. This suggests that, while helpful, the 
Colman factors should be viewed as non-exclusive considerations and not 
dispositive elements. Indeed, even the Colman court noted that the 
factors, while significant, were “not conclusive[] in determining whether 
[the alter ego] test has been met.”  
 We adopt the Colman factors as useful considerations to aid courts in 
determining whether to pierce the corporate veil. We emphasize, 
however, that they are merely helpful tools and not required elements. 
Indeed, “factors adopted as significant in a particular decision to 
disregard the corporate entity should be treated as guidelines and not as 
a conclusive test.” Rather, “a careful review of the entire relationship 
between various corporate entities and their directors and officers” is 
necessary. Thus, each alter ego case should be determined based on its 
 
 94.  Totality of the Circumstances (Totality of the Circumstances Test), BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (2012). 
 95.  Id.; see also Barnco Int’l v. Arkla, Inc., 684 So. 2d 986, 992 (La. App. 1996) (“[P]roving some of these 
factors may not result in individual liability if the totality of the circumstances negate the application of the alter 
ego concept.”). 
 96.  See generally Jones & Trevor Mktg. v. Lowry, 284 P.3d 630 (Utah 2012). 
 97.  Id. at 633. 
 98.  Id. (citing to Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (1987)). 
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individual facts by evaluating the entire relationship between the 
corporation and its shareholders.99 
The Lowry court’s explanation refers to a totality of the circumstances analysis in 
all but name. The court reserved the right to consider other facts and circumstances 
outside the eight formalities prong factors.100 Such analysis is not reserved for the 
formalities prong factors alone; such flexibility also allows courts to consider the 
totality of the circumstances, including all inequities, policy considerations, and 
other facts and circumstances, in assessing the fairness prong. The totality of the 
circumstances test is thus used as a means of analyzing both veil piercing prongs.101 
The test allows the court to consider more facts, circumstances, and policy so that it 
has a better chance of getting it right. As one court noted: 
Examination of the numerous relevant factors in a “totality of the 
circumstances” test provides a more enlightening analysis than merely 
applying metaphors, like “simulacrum,” “alter ego,” “instrumentality,” 
etc., to describe the unity of the shareholder(s) and the corporation 
justifying, where equitable, the piercing of the corporate veil in the case. 
This totality of the circumstances approach also leads to a more informed 
balancing or weighing of the primary policy behind limited liability of the 
shareholder(s), specifically, a capital investment incentive, against the 
primary policy justifying piercing of the corporate veil, specifically, the 
avoidance of clearly inequitable consequences of not piercing.102 
The totality of the circumstances test also allows the court the flexibility to utilize 
its equitable powers to “do justice” in a given situation.103 In this sense, courts should 
be viewing the veil piercing prongs as two separate totality of the circumstances 
tests.104 Before such tests were even developed, courts relied almost exclusively on 
established equitable principles to determine whether to pierce the veil.105 
 
 99.  Id. at 636 (citations omitted); see also Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 98 (W.V. 1986) (“Some 
of the factors to be considered in deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil are . . . .”). 
 100.  Jones & Trevor Mktg., 284 P.3d at 636 (citing 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET. AL., FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS §41.30 (2006)). 
 101.  See, e.g., Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 99. 
 102.  Id. But see Frank Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U.L. REV. 16, 25 
(1988) (criticizing totality of the circumstances tests as creating “overly particularistic ad hoc decisions” that 
“could not stand as precedent for any future case except a clone”). 
 103.  LFC Mktg. Grp. Inc. v. Loomis, 8 P.3d 841, 845–46 (Nev. 2000) (the “essence” of piercing the corporate 
veil is to ‘do justice’ whenever it appears that the protections provided by the corporate form are being abused.”). 
 104.  See David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 371, 376–77 (1981). 
 105.  See supra Part II.A. 
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D. Equitable Principles Applied to Veil Piercing 
At its center, veil piercing law firmly echoes governing principles derived from age-
old equity jurisprudence.106 Indeed, it reeks of equity, from the wide judicial 
discretion and adherence to ancient equitable maxims to its focus on mitigating strict 
legal rules (like limited liability) to “do justice.”107 Even though courts often get 
caught in the minutia of the veil piercing prongs and factors,108 the doctrine has been 
long rooted, in a broad sense, to the confines of equity.109 
In fact, before complicated veil piercing tests were used, courts relied solely on 
these established principles of equity to pierce the corporate veil.110 The 1937 case 
of Nettles v. Sottile is such an example.111 Depositors of the Peoples State Bank of 
South Carolina brought suit against the sole shareholder of a corporate holder of 900 
shares of the bank’s stock when the bank closed its doors as an insolvent banking 
institution.112 The plaintiff receiver for the depositors obtained a judgment against 
the corporation and attempted execution on such judgment.113 Upon finding the 
corporation also insolvent, the receiver brought suit against the individual 
shareholder of the corporation.114 The plaintiff asked the court to look beyond the 
“legal owner” of the 900 shares of the bank stock to find the “true owner” of the 
stock.115 
The Court noted that the action was, in effect, an equitable execution and was 
supplementary or auxiliary to the original action.116 A court sitting in equity could 
take steps to assist the creditor in the collection of his obligation if such assistance 
was “in the interest of justice and for the protection of the judgment creditor.”117 
In looking to the established principles of equity, the Court first referenced the 
requirement that there be no adequate remedy at law and found that the plaintiff had 
exhausted all such legal remedies.118 The Court then expounded on its inherent 
equitable flexibility to balance competing interests and rights of the parties and of 
society: 
 
 106.  See supra Part II.A. 
 107.  See supra Part II.A. 
 108.  See supra Part II.B. 
 109.  See supra Parts II.A, II.C. 
 110.  See Douglas C. Michael, To Know a Veil, 26 J. CORP. L. 41, 55–56 (2000). 
 111.  See generally Nettles v. Sottile, 191 S.E. 796 (S.C. 1937). 
 112.  Id. at 796. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 796–97. 
 116.  Id. at 798. 
 117.  Nettles v. Sottile, 191 S.E. 796, 798 (S.C. 1937). 
 118.  See Id. 
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As has been well said, equity has contrived its remedies “so that they shall 
correspond both to the primary right of the injured party, and to the 
wrong by which that right has been violated,” and “has always preserved 
the elements of flexibility and expansiveness, so that new ones may be 
invented, or old ones modified, in order to meet the requirements of every 
case, and to satisfy the needs of a progressive social condition, in, which 
new primary rights and duties are constantly arising, and new kinds of 
wrongs are constantly committed.”119 
The receiver argued that the corporation had obtained the bank stock in violation 
of South Carolina law precluding corporate entities from owning shares of bank 
stock.120 The Court agreed, reasoning that a corporation is a “mere legal fiction” and 
may, in the furtherance of justice and pursuant to equity, be disregarded if used for 
the purpose of evading a statute or violating public policy.121 The Court looked past 
the form of the corporation to the substance and intent of the defendant, which was 
to perpetrate a fraud and violate South Carolina law in an effort to evade liability.122 
The Court ruled that where a corporation is used “for fraudulent or perverted 
purposes, courts may properly disregard it and look to the responsible human beings, 
the living members, who compose the corporation and are hidden behind the juristic 
screen.”123 By disregarding the corporate form and holding the individual 
shareholder liable, the court regarded its action as doing what ought to be done 
insofar as the “wrong” done to the receiver was “righted.”124 
Veil piercing requires the kind of balancing that courts of equity are deemed 
authorized to administer.125 It requires weighing the costs and benefits of limited 
liability, analyzing and comparing the primary right of the injured party with the 
legal rights and expectations of the defendant and the interests of and implications 
on society.126 This helps explain why courts have not simplified the law by creating 
a checklist of elements to determine when the veil can be pierced or eliminating the 
doctrine of limited liability altogether.127 Veil piercing, like other equitable relief, 
 
 119.  Id. (quoting Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Cent. Republic T. Co., 11 F. Supp. 976, 982 (N.D. Ill. 1935)). 
 120.  Id. at 801. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Nettles v. Sottile, 191 S.E. 796, 801 (S.C. 1937). 
 124.  Id. at 798. 
 125.  See Michael J. Gaertner, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation Owners Have it 
Both Ways, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667, 687 (1988-1989). 
 126.  See Brett Trembly, Does Piercing the Corporate Veil Work? A Look at Possible Alternatives, TREMBLY 
L. FIRM (Sept. 24, 2017), http://tremblylaw.com/does-piercing-the-corporate-veil-work-a-look-at-possible-
alternatives/. 
 127.  Limited liability has served an important role in increasing people’s participation in the equity market 
and consequently, the availability of capital to further business growth. See Daniel R. Kahan, Shareholder 
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seeks to bypass certain legal rights of a party (the right of shareholder protection 
from corporate debts), voiding such rights in that instance.128 This is contrasted from 
a dispute at law between two parties alleging competing legal rights.129 
III. CONTRACT-TORT DISTINCTION 
Although a “major fault line” currently exists in veil piercing law between contract 
and tort creditors,130 such distinction has not always existed.131 Courts’ equitable 
exception to limited liability has existed at least since the early twentieth century.132 
However, the overwhelming countervailing concern during most of this time was the 
protection of contractual creditors.133 Consequently, such concern would have been 
evident in courts’ veil-piercing analysis, focusing on facts and circumstances that 
justify piercing the veil for contract creditors. When a company engaged in fraud or 
misrepresentation, contract creditors were misled into believing the risk of default 
was lower than it actually was.134 Because creditors in these situations were not able 
to demand adequate compensation for such risk, some of the costs of the 
corporation’s risk-taking were shifted to the contract creditors.135 Thus, piercing the 
veil was a means of reallocating risk back to the corporation’s shareholders under 
such circumstances.136 
It was not until our conception of the doctrine of limited liability was challenged 
by large-scale corporate wrongdoing137 that we began to understand the policy 
 
Liability for Corporate Torts: A Historical Perspective, 97 GEO. L.J. 1085, 1092–93 (2009). Notwithstanding 
such benefits, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman argued in their controversial 1991 article for pro rata 
unlimited liability for corporate torts. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991). 
 128.  See Manuel F. Cachan, Joshua M. Newville & Lee Popkin, Veil Piercing/Alter Ego Determinations - 
How Fund Managers Can Protect Themselves, PROSKAUER ON PRIV. EQUITY LITIG. (Oct. 11, 
2017), http://www.privateequitylitigation.com/2017/09/veil-piercingalter-ego-determinations-how-fund-
managers-can-protect-themselves/.  
 129.  See Sergiy Timokhov, Parties to the Litigation, TORONTO LITIG. LAW. (Oct. 11, 2017), 
http://www.torontolitigationlawyer.ca/court_parties.htm. 
 130.  Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Disputing Limited Liability, 104 NW. L. REV. 854, 860 (2010), 
quoted by Halabi, supra note 24, at 1029. 
 131.  See Kahan, supra note 127, at 1102. 
 132.  See Id. at 1091–1095. 
 133.  See David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1566–
67 (1991). 
 134.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 107; Thompson, An Empirical Study, supra note 19, at 107–
72. 
 135.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 107. 
 136.  See Thompson, An Empirical Study, supra note 19, at 1071. 
 137.  Kahan, supra note 127, at 1086. Such corporate wrongdoing included grotesque accidents, mass torts, 
environmental abuses and accounting frauds. Id.; see Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing 
Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1414–20 (1993). 
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justifications for allowing greater leniency in veil piercing for involuntary tort 
creditors.138 Commentators, followed by courts, slowly became cognizant of these 
policy justifications, which included the protection of involuntary creditors from the 
costs of excessive risk-taking by companies.139 The policy justifications had 
everything to do with a company’s incentive to shift costs away from itself and 
toward unwary third parties.140 Under the umbrella of limited liability, business 
entities have an incentive to undertake projects with an inefficiently high level of 
risk.141 These companies capture all the benefits from such activities while 
internalizing only some of the costs, shifting the remainder to involuntary creditors, 
such as victims of corporate torts.142 
Just as veil piercing for contract creditors was meant to protect such creditors from 
the costs of fraud and misrepresentation (on account of their inability to demand 
adequate compensation ex ante), veil piercing for tort creditors has come about, in 
part, due to such creditors’ inability to negotiate adequate compensation for corporate 
activities that have social costs in excess of their social benefits.143 Without the 
equitable remedy of veil piercing, tort creditors are, in effect, subsidizing 
corporations for their excessive risk-taking.144 
The issue can also be viewed in terms of consent to transact with the corporation: 
a contract creditor consents to transacting business with the corporation.145 This 
voluntary contract creditor has the ability, through requiring personal guarantees, 
security agreements, or similar mechanisms, to protect themselves from loss.146 The 
contract creditor is also able to diversify to some extent, while tort creditors have, 
quite possibly, suffered a loss of significant proportion in comparison with their pre-
injury wealth.147 Furthermore, the contract creditor can better gauge the risk of loss 
by performing a credit check and reviewing a company’s corporate organizational 
 
 138.  STEPHEN I. GLOVER, BUSINESS SEPARATION TRANSACTIONS: SPIN-OFFS, SUBSIDIARY IPOS AND 
TRACKING STOCK § 14.15 (2006). 
 139.  See Douglas & Shanks, supra note 29, at 210–11. 
 140.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 107. 
 141.  Id. The limited liability shield therefore allows shareholders to engage in potentially profitable activities 
without regard for externalities. Millon, supra note 1, at 1355. 
 142.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 107; Millon, supra note 1, at 1324. 
 143.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 112; Millon, supra note 1, at 1324. By choosing to do 
business with the corporation and having the ability to assess the likelihood of default before a business 
undertaking (e.g. perform a credit check), contract creditors are able compensated for the increased risk of default. 
See Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 4, at 112. 
 144.  Millon, supra note 1, at 1324. 
 145.  See Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577 (10th Cir. 1990); Easterbrook & 
Fischel, supra note 4, at 112; Millon, supra note 1, at 1324. 
 146.  See Cascade Energy & Metals Corp., 896 F.2d at 1577. 
 147.  See Leebron, supra note 133, at 1602. 
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documents.148 A court of equity should be less willing to grant relief to a creditor that 
had the prospective ability to protect itself through verifying information and 
obtaining security interests and guarantees.149 But in involuntary cases, there is little 
or no element of consensual dealing, and the question is whether investors should be 
able to transfer a risk of loss or injury to members of the general public.150 
A creditor’s consent to transact with the corporation also plays a role in whether 
undercapitalization will be a significant factor in the veil piercing analysis.151 In 
contract cases, the extent of the corporation’s capitalization is largely ignored.152 This 
is because initial capitalization is usually disclosed in publicly-filed documents, 
allowing parties to assess the initial financing of the company.153 The contract 
 
 148.  See Elizabeth S. Fenton, Trends in Piercing the Corporate Veil, 20 BUS. TORTS LITIG. 10, 10 (2013). 
 149.  See Millon, supra note 1, at 1324; Kenneth B. Watt, Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil: A Need 
for Clarification of Oklahoma’s Approach, 28 TULSA L.J. 869, 872–73 (1993) (arguing that in contract claims, 
the plaintiff must prove a higher degree of culpability than tort cases because the contract plaintiff “has sufficient 
information to make an informed choice . . . before entering the transaction”). 
 150.  Hamilton, supra 30, 984–985. Courts generally discuss this issue in the context of tort creditors as not 
consenting to dealings with the corporation. See, e.g., United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 
1985). Although it is true that certain torts would be considered consensual (for example, breach of fiduciary 
duty, see Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577 (10th Cir. 1990)), tort plaintiffs are 
otherwise rarely consensual creditors and cannot be taken to have assumed the risk of a corporation’s insolvency. 
David Cummins, Comment, Disregarding the Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 459 
(1967). Similarly, some contract creditors would be considered nonconsensual because of significantly unequal 
bargaining power and the inability to obtain the above-mentioned protections. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 
13, § 41.85 (“when parties contracting with a corporation are not commercially experienced enough to anticipate 
the problems that might result from dealing with an inadequately capitalized corporation, the tort/contract 
distinction may not always be held against them”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 4, at 110 (“Piercing the 
veil—especially in favor of trade creditors and tort creditors who cannot negotiate with the firm—reduces the 
extent to which third parties bear these costs.”). Additionally, employment discrimination judgment creditors, 
although based on a consensual, employment relationship, would more accurately be deemed involuntary 
creditors due to the imbalance in bargaining power between employer and employee and the fact that employees 
(particularly unsophisticated ones) cannot always be expected to understand the nature of his or her employment 
agreement. See Morris, supra note 89, at 294 (noting an exception to limited liability for consensual creditors 
exists where the creditor should not be expected to understand the nature of the agreement); see generally Sandra 
F. Sperino, Let’s Pretend Discrimination is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107 (2014) (discussing how courts 
characterize employment discrimination statutes as torts). For the sake of simplicity, I assume all tort creditors 
are involuntary and all contract creditors are voluntary. 
 151.  See Nicholas Allen, Reverse Piercing of the Corporate Veil: A Straightforward Path to Justice, 85 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 1147, 1150 (2012) (explaining that a traditional piercing of the corporate veil requires a showing 
that “the owners exercised complete domination of the corporation in respect to the transaction attacked”). 
 152.  See Marcantel, supra note 36, at 200. 
 153.  See Mark Koba, Initial Public Offering, CNBC EXPLAINS (Apr. 20, 2012), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
id/47099278. This argument only holds true for such entities that are required to indicate initial capital stock. Id. 
But see, Mark J. Loewenstein, Fiduciary Duties and Unincorporated Business Entities: In Defense of the 
“Manifestly Unreasonable” Standard, 41 TULSA L. REV. 411, 437 (2005-2006) (“The historical importance of 
fiduciary duties in partnerships does not mean, of course that fiduciary duties must be mandatory in contemporary 
unincorporated business entities.”). Some limited liability entities, such as limited liability companies (which do 
PETERSON_Piercing the Corp Veil by Tort Creditors (Do Not Delete) 1/2/2018  3:36 PM 
 CHRISTOPHER W. PETERSON 
VOL. 13, NO. 1 2017 81 
creditor that chooses to do business with an underfinanced company is knowingly 
assuming the risk that the company might not have assets to pay its financial 
obligations.154 Tort creditors, on the other hand, do not choose whether or not to deal 
with the corporation.155 An undercapitalized corporation is able to externalize the 
costs of risky corporate behavior by passing such costs on to the tort creditor without 
their consent.156 
One commentator contrasted the economic considerations for involuntary tort 
creditors from those of voluntary contract creditors as follows:  
Involuntary, or tort, creditors are in a quite different situation. The 
pedestrian hit by a taxi cab or the victim of a toxic waste spill has not 
agreed to assume the risk of corporate insolvency and shareholders’ 
limited liability. He has not received ex ante compensation for doing so 
or had the opportunity to bargain for contractual safeguards. The owners 
of a limited liability entity therefore are in a position to shift some of the 
social costs of their business activity onto members of the public who have 
not agreed to bear those costs. As long as an activity holds some promise 
of increasing shareholder wealth, limited liability encourages 
shareholders (or their representatives) to undertake it without regard for 
the magnitude of possible social costs, which may be far greater than the 
benefits to the owners themselves. In this respect, limited liability for tort 
claims creates a moral hazard problem and results in inefficient resource 
allocation decisions.157 
The strength of a tort creditor’s policy justifications is partially offset by the 
benefits of retaining limited liability when a closely held corporation faces tort 
liability that its owners did not reasonably foresee.158 This occurs in the context of 
damages that exceed the insurance coverage that a reasonably prudent business 
 
not have stock), are not required to do so. Mark J. Loewenstein, Fiduciary Duties and Unincorporated Business 
Entities: In Defense of the “Manifestly Unreasonable” Standard, 41 TULSA L. REV. 411, 437 (2005-2006) (“The 
historical importance of fiduciary duties in partnerships does not mean, of course that fiduciary duties must be 
mandatory in contemporary unincorporated business entities.”). 
 154.  See, e.g., Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 100 (W.V. 1986) (noting that when, under the 
circumstances, a party has the opportunity to conduct an investigation into the credit of the corporation prior to 
entering into such contract, such party will be deemed to have assumed the risk of any gross undercapitalization). 
 155.  Fenton, supra note 148, at 10 (describing a tort creditor as an “involuntary creditor” ). 
 156.  See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the 
Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853, 887 (1997). 
 157.  Millon, supra note 1, at 1316–1317. 
 158.  See Gevurtz, supra note 156, at 887. 
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would obtain under the circumstances.159 Shareholders cannot be deemed “at fault” 
in causing the tort creditor’s loss when insolvency results from events that a 
reasonable shareholder could not anticipate or the occurrence of which was 
reasonably deemed to be a remote possibility.160 Limited liability would be 
acceptable in such situations as the benefits to society of retaining such limited 
liability would outweigh the cost to the tort victim for the unforeseeable claim.161 
Our current veil piercing jurisprudence, therefore, represents an acknowledgment 
that altering the extent of limited liability so as to reduce its social costs is appropriate 
under certain circumstances, but wholesale elimination of the doctrine is not 
appropriate.162 The very act of holding investors and other related parties liable helps 
to shift these social costs away from creditors.163 Only within the last few decades 
have a substantial number of courts acknowledged the need to further alter the extent 
of shareholder liability to tort creditors.164 
IV. VEIL-PIERCING TESTS IN THE TORT CONTEXT 
Courts that have referenced the contract-tort dichotomy have almost unanimously 
agreed that judicial veil piercing is more flexible for tort, as opposed to ordinary 
contract creditors.165 Naturally, this begs the question as to how courts are providing 
 
 159.  See Millon, supra note 1, at 1308 (“[L]imited liability would protect shareholders from the kinds of 
losses that should be their primary concern, namely business insolvency due to causes that could not reasonably 
have been anticipated or prevented: contractual obligations that are unpayable because of developments that were 
unforeseen when they were undertaken and tort claims that exceed an insurance policy’s reasonably chosen cover 
limit.”). 
 160.  See Id. at 1341–42. 
 161.  See Robert J. Rhee, Bonding Limited Liability, 51. WM. & MARY L. REV. 1417, 1421 (2009-2010) (no 
reasonable society would allow limited liability to stand if “the firm’s activity would impose a net social cost”). 
 162.  Millon, supra note 1, at 1357–58. 
 163.  Id. at 1374. 
 164.  See Hamilton, supra note 30, at 985 (different public policy issues of torts and contract claims “is only 
dimly perceived by many courts, which indiscriminately cite and purport to apply tort precedents in contract 
cases and vice versa”). 
 165.  See, e.g., Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 565 (N.D. 1985) (citing United States v. Jon-T Chems., 
Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 692–93 (5th Cir. 1985)); Edwards Co., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 977, 980–
984 (5th Cir. 1984); Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577 (10th Cir. 1990); Tower 
Investors, LLC v. 111 E. Chestnut Consultants, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 927, 941 (2007); Theberge v. Darbro, Inc., 684 
A.2d 1298, 1301 (Me. 1996); Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., 592 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (La. 1992); Southern Elec. 
Supply Co. v. Raleigh City Nat’l Bank, 320 S.E.2d 515, 522 n.13 (W.V. 1984); Northbound Grp., Inc. v. Norvax, 
Inc., 795 F.3d 647, 652 (7th Cir. 2015); D’Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 147 P.3d 515, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); 
Perpetual Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Michaelson Props., Inc., 974 F.2d 545, 550 (4th Cir. 1992); Penn Nat’l 
Gaming, Inc. v. Ratliff, 954 So. 2d 427, 431–32 (Miss. 2007); OMV Assocs., L.P. v. Clearway Acquisition, Inc., 
976 N.E.2d 185, 192 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012); Secon Serv. Sys. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 
415–16 (7th Cir. 1988). But see Rice v. Oriental Fireworks Co., 707 P.2d 1250, 1255 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); 
Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Pester Mktg. Co., No. 95-1367-JTM, 1997 WL 225900 (D. Kan. Apr. 25, 1997) (denying 
defendants’ argument for a stricter veil piercing standard in contract cases, noting “there is no Kansas authority 
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such flexibility. Under certain circumstances, courts have applied a different veil-
piercing standard, such as a plaintiff’s attempt to assert personal jurisdiction over a 
parent and subsidiary.166 Under such circumstances, some courts impose an even 
higher standard than traditional veil piercing doctrine.167 However, in regards to the 
contract-tort dichotomy, courts generally apply the same test to both types of 
creditors but reach different results.168 The equitable, totality-of-the-circumstances 
test is applied more leniently in tort cases because of the different policy 
implications.169 
A. Same Test Applied More Leniently 
Many, if not most, courts that have referenced the tort-contract dichotomy have 
simply stated that a tort creditor can more easily pierce the veil, without creating a 
separate rule for tort creditors.170 In many of these cases, we are left with little 
direction as to how the same rule is applied to tort creditors as opposed to contract 
creditors.171 When viewed in light of established equitable principles and the totality 
of the circumstances, however, courts have alluded to the ways in which veil piercing 
is more flexible for tort creditors.172 As one court noted, even though the legal 
precepts governing veil piercing in contract and tort claims are substantially the 
 
for this rule, and it has been rejected by the Kansas Court of Appeals”) (citing Kvassay v. Murray, 808 P.2d 896, 
906 (Kan. App. 1991)); Hammock v. Calo, No. CA95-03-022, 1995 WL 631653 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 30, 1995) 
(refusing to “follow the example of other jurisdictions” in imposing “a less stringent standard for piercing the 
corporate veil in tort actions”); 1 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 13, § 41.85. 
 166.  See, e.g., John Swain & Edwin Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal Jurisdiction over 
Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U.L. REV. 445, 454456 (2004). 
 167.  See id. 
 168.  Barber, supra note 104, at 381; Halabi, supra note 24, at 1014 (2015). 
 169.  Jane C. Schlicht, Comment, Piercing the Nonprofit Corporate Veil, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 134, 141 (1982) 
(explaining that courts defend the totality-of-the-circumstances-test because of its “equitable nature”). 
 170.  See, e.g., Secon Serv. Sys. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 414 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting 
that it is “a lot harder” to pierce the veil in contract disputes than for tort judgments and that “Indiana courts 
consider the same sorts of factors in both tort and contract cases”); Meredith Dearborn, Comment, Enterprise 
Liability: Reviewing and Revitalizing Liability for Corporate Groups, 97 CAL. L. REV. 195, 197 n. 16 (2009) 
(“[P]iercing the corporate veil does not doctrinally differentiate between tort and contract creditors.”); Halabi, 
supra note 24, at 1033 (“Many jurisdictions do not specify particular differences in their three-part tests but allow 
generally for heightened review in contract cases.”). 
 171.  See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 172.  Schlict, supra note 169, at 141 (explain that courts defend totality of the circumstances tests because 
“its equitable nature demands that it be flexible”). 
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same, the attitude toward veil piercing is more flexible in tort.173 In fact, tort claims 
influence a court’s leniency in assessing both veil piercing prongs.174 
1. Tort Claims Effect on Formalities Prong 
The formalities prong requires a showing of such unity of interest and ownership that 
the separate personalities of the corporation, LLC or other separate entity and of the 
individual owners no longer exist.175 Courts make such determinations by a totality 
of the circumstances test, relying heavily on the existence of certain factors.176 The 
judge is at liberty to weigh the importance of each factor, in relation to the facts and 
circumstances of the case, to determine whether the prong has been satisfied.177 Upon 
requesting its veil piercing remedy in the context of a tort claim against the 
shareholder or related entity, courts have reweighted the various factors in favor of a 
finding of unity of interest and ownership.178 
a. Axtmann v. Chillemi 
The North Dakota Supreme Court provided such flexibility to the formalities prong 
factors in Axtmann v. Chillemi.179 In this case, the plaintiffs sued a real estate agent 
and real estate broker for fraud and obtained a judgment against both.180 The real 
estate brokerage dissolved immediately prior to the judgment.181 The plaintiffs 
brought a subsequent action against the sole shareholder of the brokerage, an officer 
of the brokerage and a related, successor company, alleging fraudulent transfer to the 
related company and requesting that the corporate veil of the brokerage be pierced to 
reach all the new defendants.182 
 
 173.  See, e.g., Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc. v. Ratliff, 954 So. 2d 427, 431–32 (Miss. 2007) (“While we have 
never articulated whether a different standard applies to tort claims, precedent from other jurisdictions suggests 
that the same basic standard should apply.”); Miles v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 703 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1983); 
Dearborn, supra note 170, at 197 n. 16 (“[P]iercing the corporate veil does not doctrinally differentiate between 
tort and contract creditors.”); Barber, supra note 104, at 381 (one might expect different treatment for contract 
and tort but most courts mechanically apply the same test to both situations). 
 174.  See Oh, supra note 24, at 87 (noting that it widely accepted that “veil-piercing is more compelling in 
[t]ort than [c]ontract” cases). 
 175.  See supra Part II.B. 
 176.  See supra Part II.B. 
 177.  Schlict, supra note 169, at 142 (explaining that courts balance a number of factors to determine if the 
two-prong test has been satisfied). 
 178.  Id. at 143 (arguing that courts will only pierce a corporate veil when, among other factors, “a unity of 
interest and ownership between the corporation and its shareholders” has terminated”). 
 179.  See generally Axtmann v. Chillemi, 740 N.W.2d 838 (N.D. 2007). 
 180.  Id. at 842. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. at 84243. 
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The Court applied a series of eight factors—North Dakota’s version of the 
formalities prong factors—that were used to assess each defendant’s relationship to 
the operation of the corporation to determine whether each individual defendant was 
the alter ego of the corporation.183 These factors included insufficient capitalization, 
failure to observe corporate formalities, nonpayment of dividends, insolvency at the 
time of the transaction in question, siphoning of funds by the dominant shareholder, 
nonfunctioning of other officers and directors, absence of corporate records, and the 
existence of the corporation as a mere facade for individual dealings.184 Additionally, 
the Court required an element of injustice, inequity, or fundamental unfairness in 
order to pierce the veil—North Dakota’s fairness prong.185 
Before assessing the eight factors, the Court “recognized that the attitude toward 
piercing the corporate veil is more flexible in tort than in contract, because the 
creditor has an element of choice inherent in a voluntary contractual relationship 
whereas the ordinary tort case forces the debtor-creditor relationship upon the 
creditor by the occurrence of an unexpected tort.”186 The Court first ruled that the 
trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding requisite evidence for three of the 
eight factors: that the broker was undercapitalized, insolvent, and a pass-through 
corporation with no substantial assets.187 
In upholding the trial court’s overall finding to pierce the corporate veil of the 
broker, the Court specifically noted that its veil-piercing analysis was informed by 
the underlying tort judgment.188 The Court identified lack of capitalization as a factor 
that was “particularly significant” to its formalities prong analysis in tort cases.189 
The fact that the corporate broker was marginally financed also played a role in the 
court’s fairness analysis as it involved an “added policy consideration” of whether 
shareholders may transfer such risk of loss to the public.190 
Axtmann demonstrates how tort claims affect a court’s veil piercing analysis when 
the test for contract and tort claimants is the same.191 North Dakota uses the same 
 
 183.  Id. at 843 (citing Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 563 (N.D. 1985)) (quoting Victoria Elevator 
Co. v. Meridian Grain Co., Inc., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 1979)) (compiling a list of factors to determine 
whether the defendant was the alter ego of the corporation)). 
 184.  Id. at 843 (citing Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 563 (N.D. 1985))(quoting Victoria Elevator 
Co. v. Meridian Grain Co., Inc., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 1979)). 
 185.  Axtmann v. Chillemi, 740 N.W.2d 838, 843 (N.D. 2007) (citing Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 
56364 (N.D. 1985)). 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. at 847. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  See Halabi, supra note 24, at 1014 (finding that while tort and contract based claims are examined with 
the same test, “tort based veil-piercing claims succeeded at a higher rate than contract claims”). 
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veil piercing test in contract cases as it does in tort cases.192 However, in tort cases, 
the court was allowed more flexibility in re-weighting factors in favor of veil 
piercing.193 A finding of undercapitalization also triggered an “added policy 
consideration,” in the context of a tort creditor, that influenced the fairness 
requirement.194 Perhaps if the claim had been one of contract and the 
undercapitalization factor had not been weighted so heavily, the outcome would have 
been different.195 
b. Secon Service System, Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co. 
The effect of a tort claim on the formalities prong factors is also evident in contract 
cases196 where the court makes specific reference to the contract-tort dichotomy.197 
Secon Service System, Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co. involved a contract dispute 
between Secon Service System, Inc. and a trucking company, in which Secon Service 
sought to pierce the veil of the trucking company to reach the assets of St. Joseph 
Bank & Trust Co.—a creditor of the trucking company.198 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first acknowledged 
the confusion surrounding veil piercing jurisprudence but noted that one of the points 
that stood out was the fact that “it is a lot harder to hold investors liable in contract 
disputes than for tort judgments.”199 The Court continued by noting that contract 
creditors voluntarily transact with the other party and are afforded an opportunity to 
negotiate terms reflecting enhanced risk of doing business with a limited liability 
 
 192.  See, e.g., Monster Heavy Haulers, LLC v. Goliath Energy Servs., LLC, 883 N.W.2d 917, 927 (N.D. 
2016). 
 193.  See Southern Elec. Supply Co. v. Raleigh City Nat’l Bank, 320 S.E.2d 515, 523 (W.V. 1984) (listing a 
number of factors to be considered when determining whether to pierce the corporate veil in a tort case). 
 194.  Axtmann, 740 N.W. at 84344 (citing Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 565 (N.D. 1985)) (finding 
that [i]n tort cases, particular significance is placed on whether a corporation is undercapitalized, which involves 
an added public policy consideration”). 
 195.  Id. at 844 (finding that five of the eight factors dictated against piercing). 
 196.  The overwhelming majority of veil-piercing cases are contract-based. See Thompson, An Empirical 
Study, supra note 19, 1058 t.9; Oh, supra note 24, at 124 (“As in Thompson’s study, veil-piercing claims arise 
in Contract more than in any other substantive claim.”). However, many of these cases reference the contract-
tort distinction in justifying a stricter standard for contract claimants. See, e.g., Northbound Grp., Inc. v. Norvax, 
Inc., 795 F.3d 647, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 
F.2d 406, 413 (7th Cir. 1988); Perpetual Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Michaelson Props., Inc., 974 F.2d 545, 550 
(4th Cir. 1992). Such cases are thus helpful in determining the way in which a court would apply veil piercing 
law more leniently to tort creditors. 
 197.  Secon Serv. Sys., Inc., 855 F.2d at 413. 
 198.  Id. at 407409. 
 199.  Id. at 413 (citing PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND 
OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS §26.02 
(1987)). 
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entity.200 Contrarily, tort creditors do not have a chance to obtain compensation after 
the fact for exposure to increased risk.201 
In reviewing whether to pierce the veil, the Court balanced a long list of factors, 
all of which were important but non dispositive.202 These factors helped the court 
determine whether the plaintiff was an “innocent third party” that needed protection 
from the corporation.203 The Court also required a showing of fraud or injustice.204 
The plaintiff argued that he had conclusively established that the bank controlled the 
trucking company and was therefore entitled to pierce the veil.205 The Court rejected 
the plaintiff’s argument, stating that even if the bank controlled the trucking 
company, such control “is only one of the elements required.”206 In contract cases, 
the Court continued, Indiana courts always had required more than control to pierce 
the corporate veil for the benefit of contract creditors.207 Unless the corporation 
engaged in some practice that might have misled its contract creditors into thinking 
they were dealing with another entity, there simply was no need to “protect” them.208 
In noting that the contract creditor needed to satisfy more than just the control 
factor, the Court qualified the requirement by limiting it to contract creditors.209 The 
constant comparison to tort creditors evidenced its willingness to provide significant 
leniency to tort creditors in satisfying the balancing of the factors.210 “Unlike tort 
claimants, [the contract creditor plaintiff] chose to deal with the corporation.”211 
Furthermore, in an effort to make the point even more clear, the Court affirmed that 
contract creditors are required to provide “additional evidence” because of the 
“possibility” that they might have been unable to determine with whom they were 
dealing.212 Additional evidence as compared to whom? There is no doubt the court 
 
 200.  Id. at 413–14. 
 201.  Id. at 414. 
 202.  Id.  
 203.  Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 414 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 204.  Id. (quoting Extra Energy Coal Co. v. Diamond Energy and Res., Inc., 467 N.E.2d 439, 441–42 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1984)). 
 205.  Id. at 409. 
 206.  Id. at 415. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. at 415–416. 
 209.  Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis 
added); see, e.g., Extra Energy Coal Co. v. Diamond Energy and Res., Inc., 467 N.E.2d at 441 (separate corporate 
identity upheld in the absence of evidence that the contract creditor “was in any way deceived as to with whom 
it was dealing”); Hinds v. McNair, 129 N.E.2d 553, 559 (Ind. 1955) (purchase of real estate from corporation 
with distinct name does not give rise to investor liability); Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 599 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 
1979); United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 210.  Secon Serv. Sys., Inc., 855 F.2d at 413. 
 211.  Id. at 416 (emphasis added). 
 212.  Id. 
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was alluding to the fact that because tort creditors do not know with whom they are 
dealing (indeed, they often do not intend to “deal” with the corporation at all), and 
would therefore “need protection” from the corporation as innocent third parties, then 
they may simply be required to establish control, along with some kind of injustice, 
in order to pierce the veil.213 
c. True Motivation Behind Formalities Prong 
With so much focus on courts’ varied set of factors making up the formalities prong, 
it is no wonder such confusion exists with respect to veil piercing jurisprudence.214 
But what is the real motivation behind the law’s emphasis on these factors? Are 
courts truly worried about the separate personality of a corporation? After all, with 
most states allowing for the creation of single member LLCs215 and single 
shareholder corporations,216 there is no doubt that decisions of the business owner 
will also be the decisions of the business entity. And legislatures have therefore 
acknowledged that such management structures are permissible.217 
Instead of the metaphysical separation between shareholder and corporation, 
courts are more concerned with the casual manner in which the relationship was 
managed, and how such management increases the likelihood that the corporation 
would impose inefficient harms on third parties.218 The emphasis on the separate 
personality of the corporation is a rhetorical device that courts employ to justify 
discouraging socially-harmful management of the corporation.219 In no other case is 
the protection of third parties from inefficient harms more pronounced than in the 
case of the tort creditor.220 Consequently, courts should be more lenient in finding 
evidence of lack of separation in such cases.221 
2. Tort Claims Effect on Fairness Prong 
The fact that a creditor is pursuing a tort claim as the foundation of its veil-piercing 
remedy may have the most marked impact in the fairness prong.222 This prong is 
 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  See Gevurtz, supra note 156, at 854–58. 
 215.  See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §401(A) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2006). 
 216.  Id. § 401. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  See Macey & Mitts, supra note 23, at 129–30. 
 219.  Id. at 130. 
 220.  See supra Part III. 
 221.  See generally Northbound Grp., Inv. v. Norvax, Inc., 795 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that Illinois 
doctrine of direct participant liability did not authorize the imposition of liability for breach of contract). 
 222.  See, e.g., Marcantel, supra note 36, at 199 (arguing that the contract-tort distinction “makes sense, if 
nowhere else, when discussing the injustice element of the piercing doctrine”). 
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central to the equitable nature of the remedy, focusing on facts and circumstances 
demonstrating some wrongdoing, fraud, illegality, injustice, or inequitable result that 
will occur if the defendant entity’s veil is not pierced.223 The facts and circumstances 
to prove the fairness prong are, however, often vastly different for tort and contract 
creditors.224 
a. Northbound Group, Inc. v. Norvax, Inc. 
Northbound Group, Inc. v. Norvax, Inc. is an example of the influence the tort-
contract distinction has on the second, fairness prong.225 In Northbound Group, Inc., 
the plaintiff sued several defendants on contract-based claims arising from the sale 
of its business to the defendants.226 The defendants included the parent company of 
the wholly-owned defendant with which the plaintiff had contracted in the sale of its 
business and the plaintiff sought to pierce the veil of the subsidiary defendant.227 
The Seventh Circuit first assessed the instrumentalities (formalities) prong and 
determined that the parent company was the mere instrumentality of its subsidiary.228 
However, the plaintiff offered no evidence that respecting the separate corporate 
existence of the subsidiary would sanction a fraud or promote injustice, which was 
the second prong of the Illinois veil piercing law.229 The court reasoned that this 
second prong “is especially difficult for a party to make in a breach of contract action 
where ‘courts should apply even more stringent standards to determine when to 
pierce the corporate veil than they would in tort cases.’”230 The court then described 
the policy justification for allowing such leniency for tort creditors: the inability to 
obtain compensation for increased risk, as opposed to a contract creditor’s voluntary 
arrangement with the corporation and opportunity to negotiate terms reflecting 
enhanced risk, such as requiring guarantees.231 The plaintiff’s argument of fraud or 
injustice was found to be meritless and the court refused to pierce the veil.232 
 
 223.  See supra Part II.B. 
 224.  See Edwards Co., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., 730 F.2d 977, 980–84 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing distinction 
between tort and contract cases for corporate veil purposes). 
 225.  See Northbound Grp., Inc. v. Norvax, Inc., 795 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 226.  Id. at 649. 
 227.  Id. at 650–51. 
 228.  Id. at 652. 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  Id. (quoting Tower Inv’rs, LLC v. 111 East Chestnut Consultants, 864 N.E.2d 927, 941 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2007)). 
 231.  Northbound Grp., Inv. v. Norvax, Inc., 795 F.3d 647, 652–53 (quoting Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. 
Joseph Bank & Tr. Co., 855 F.2d 406, 413–114 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
 232.  Id. at 653. 
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The Northbound Group, Inc. court specifically noted the leniency with which it 
adjudicates the second prong of the veil piercing test with respect to tort creditors.233 
By using a somewhat vague and undefined term like “injustice,”234 the court could 
assess the totality of the circumstances when considering the strong tort creditor’s 
policy argument in determining that an injustice had occurred for such a creditor.235 
b. Perpetual Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Michaelson Properties, Inc. 
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the fairness prong is also illustrative.236 In Perpetual 
Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Michaelson Properties, Inc., the Court discussed 
Virginia’s veil piercing law by first reviewing the formalities prong factors.237 Proof 
of these factors, alone, was not enough to pierce the veil, however.238 Virginia law 
also required a showing that the corporation was used to disguise a wrong, obscure 
fraud or conceal crime—a fairness prong.239 
The contract creditor plaintiff argued that the fairness prong could be satisfied by 
a showing of “fundamental unfairness” – likely as a means of “disguising a 
wrong.”240 The Court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant 
disguised a wrong, obscured fraud, or concealed a crime.241 In so ruling, the Court 
held the contract creditor to a “more stringent standard” because it voluntarily and 
knowingly entered into the agreement and was expected to “suffer the consequences 
of the limited liability” that are part of the corporate organization, which “is not the 
situation in tort cases.”242 The more stringent standard for contract creditors 
referenced by the court included a showing of misrepresentation.243 
The court’s reasoning for the more stringent standard centered on the contracting 
parties’ ability to allocate the risk of the transaction themselves.244 And the term 
“more stringent standard” was specifically used in comparison to tort cases, where 
 
 233.  See id. at 652–53. 
 234.  See Macey & Mitts, supra note 23, at 106–08 (discussing vague terms such as promoting fraud, injustice 
or illegalities as justifications for piercing the veil). 
 235.  Northbound Grp., Inc., 795 F.3d at 652. 
 236.  See Perpetual Real Estate v. Michaelson Prop. Inc., 974 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 237.  Id. at 548–49. 
 238.  Id. at 549. 
 239.  Id. at 548 (quoting Cheatle v. Rudd’s Swimming Pool Supply Co., 360 S.E.2d 828, 831 (Va. 1987)). 
 240.  Id. at 549 (quoting DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th 
Cir. 1976)). 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Perpetual Real Estate v. Michaelson Prop. Inc., 974 F.2d 545, 550 (4th Cir. 1992). (quoting 1 WILLIAM 
M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS. § 41.85 (1990)). 
 243.  Id. (quoting United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 693 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
 244.  Id. (“Absent some evidence of misrepresentation, courts should not rewrite contracts or disturb the 
allocation of risk the parties have themselves established.”). 
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the plaintiff does not “voluntarily and knowingly” enter into an agreement with the 
corporate defendant.245 Furthermore, in rejecting the plaintiff’s argument for a more 
lenient showing of “fundamental unfairness,” the court concluded by stating that 
“fairness is for the parties to the contract to evaluate, not the courts.”246 One can infer 
how the court would therefore treat tort creditors by its focus on whether the parties 
transacted with each other voluntarily, were able to allocate risk among themselves, 
and could evaluate the fairness of the transaction.247 In the situation where the parties 
are unable to evaluate fairness, the court left open the possibility for tort creditors to 
satisfy the fairness prong by the more lenient showing of fundamental unfairness.248 
B. A Legislative Response 
In an effort to circumvent broad veil piercing common law, the Texas legislature has 
gone further than any other state in statutorily protecting shareholders from veil-
piercing.249 And although it memorialized the higher standard in statute, the specific 
wording of the statute evidences a clear intention by the legislature to protect 
involuntary tort creditors.250 
Texas veil piercing law has changed significantly over the past few decades.251 
Notwithstanding the changes, the Texas legislature and courts have continued 
differentiating claims based on tort and those based on contract.252 Texas courts once 
exclusively followed the alter ego theory of veil piercing liability, under which 
shareholders could be held liable “when there exists such unity between the 
corporation and individual that the corporation ceases to be separate and when 
holding only the corporation liable would promote [fraud or] injustice.”253 A totality 
of the circumstances test was used to review the shareholder’s dealings with the 
 
 245.  Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 41.85, at 712 (1990)). 
 246.  Id. at 551. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Perpetual Real Estate v. Michaelson Prop. Inc., 974 F.2d 545, 551 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 249.  See Allen Sparkman, Will Your Veil be Pierced? How Strong is Your Entity’s Liab. Shield?—Piercing 
the Veil, Alter Ego, Ego, and Other Bases for Holding an Owner Liable for Debts of an Entity, 12 HASTINGS 
BUS. L.J. 349, 424 (2016). 
 250.  Id. at 425. 
 251.  See generally Elizabeth S. Miller, Are There Limits on Limited Liability? Owner Liability Protection 
and Piercing the Veil of Texas Business Entities, 43 TEX. J. BUS. L. 405 (2009). 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex. 1990) (citing Castleberry v. Barnscum, 721 
S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986), superseded by statute, TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 2.21 (West 2010) (expired), 
as recognized in SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 455 (Tex. 2008)). 
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corporation in determining whether there was an alter ego relationship.254 For 
evidence of such a relationship, Texas courts relied on several relevant, nonexclusive 
(formalities) factors.255 Courts also looked at whether the claims sounded in tort or 
contract, allowing tort claimants more leniency in satisfying the fairness prong 
without a showing of fraud.256 
Texas veil piercing law was broadened with the introduction of the “sham to 
perpetrate a fraud” theory in Castleberry v. Branscum in 1986.257 In Castleberry, the 
Texas Supreme Court pierced the corporate veil on the basis that “the separate 
corporate existence would bring about an inequitable result.”258 Both contract 
creditors and tort creditors needed only to prove constructive fraud instead of actual 
fraud.259 The Castleberry court advanced a “flexible fact-specific approach focusing 
on equity,” relying on “common sense and justice.”260 
The Texas legislature responded by amending the Texas Business Corporation 
Act261 (which subsequently carried forward into the Business Organizations Code) 
such that a shareholder could not be held liable for corporate debts with respect to 
“any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter relating to or arising 
from the obligation on the basis that the [shareholder] was the alter ego of the 
corporation or on the basis of actual or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a 
fraud, or other similar theory.”262 Instead, such contract creditors (and creditors with 
claims relating to or arising from contracts) were required to show that the 
shareholder “caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and 
did perpetrate an actual fraud.”263 The legislature also eliminated a shareholder’s 
liability for failure to follow certain corporate formalities.264 
Although Texas Bar committee commentary characterizes the “constructive 
fraud,” Castleberry standard of veil piercing as “questionable” for contractually-
 
 254.  Id. at 228 (“An alter ego relationship may be shown from the total dealings of the corporation and the 
individual.”); Miller, supra note 251, at 1; see generally Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp. of Houston, 528 S.W.2d 
571, 573 (Tex. 1975). 
 255.  See, e.g., Mancorp, 802 S.W.2d at 228. 
 256.  See Gentry, 528 S.W.2d 573. 
 257.  See generally Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986) superseded by statute, TEX. BUS. 
CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 2.21 (West 2010) (expired), as recognized in SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) 
Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 455 (Tex. 2008)). 
 258.  Id. at 272–73. 
 259.  Id. at 273. 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  Texas Business Corporation Act of 1956, TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 1.01 et seq., repealed by 
Texas Business Organizations Code of 2003, TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 1 et seq. 
 262.  TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(a)(2) (West 2017); see also Miller, supra note 251, at 3. 
 263.  Id. § 21.223(b). 
 264.  Id. § 21.223(a)(3). 
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based tort claims,265 claims based on tort that are unconnected to contract were not 
included.266 The Texas legislature clearly went out of its way to limit the strict fraud 
requirement to contract creditors and creditors with claims “relating to or arising 
from” contracts.267 It is therefore likely that the broad Castleberry standard still 
applies to tort creditors.268 
C. Should Courts Apply a Separate Test for Tort Creditors? 
In an effort to ensure that tort victims are protected from the adverse consequences 
of limited liability, some commentators have proposed a completely separate veil-
piercing test – one that focuses on a controlling shareholder or manager’s duty to 
adequately capitalize the corporation.269 According to this theory, the basis of 
liability would be determined according to established principles of tort policy.270 
Tort policy would thus focus on the party better able to bear the loss, deter the 
formation of “shell” corporations, and ask whether the shareholder is better suited to 
determine the extent of risk and insure against it.271 
The tort policy analysis would also resolve the issue of the extent of a defendant’s 
damages. Because the measure of damages should follow the breach of duty, the 
defendant’s liability would be capped at the lesser of the amount of the plaintiff’s 
injury or the level of capital deemed adequate or reasonable.272 Business owners are 
therefore protected from extra-ordinary liability from corporate torts.273 
Although the tort-duty solution does simplify the veil-piercing analysis for tort 
victims considerably, and admittedly has many other beneficial effects, such a drastic 
change in one hundred years of veil piercing jurisprudence could only be justified if 
such jurisprudence was not adequately protecting these victims from the adverse 
consequences of limited liability.274 Indeed, these same commentators discuss the 
negative consequences of limited liability on tort victims, claiming that we have all 
“then moved on as though there is nothing to do about this unfortunate wrinkle in the 
 
 265.  See Miller, supra note 251, at 3–4 (citing TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ART. 2.21, Comment of Bar Committee–
1996). 
 266.  TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223 (West 2017). 
 267.  Id. § 21.223(a)(2). 
 268.  See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223 (West 2017). The Author has found no tort cases, 
unrelated to contract, that confirm this. However, the purposeful wording of the statute makes this fairly certain. 
See id. 
 269.  See Michael, supra note 110, at 50. 
 270.  See id. 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Id. 
 273.  See generally id. 
 274.  See generally id. 
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economic perfection of the law” as if the law had yet to provide a viable solution.275 
Such arguments fly in the face of the clearly established trend by courts over the last 
few decades to acknowledge the policy justifications for tort-creditor leniency and to 
provide such leniency in assessing both the formalities and fairness prongs of the 
existing veil-piercing law.276 
V. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS GOVERN 
Notwithstanding the wide spectrum of specific veil-piercing “tests” across the 
country, commentators agree, interestingly enough, that judges generally reach the 
correct results in the cases they decide.277 But how can such different veil piercing 
tests come to the same correct conclusions? Surely if one jurisdiction emphasized 
certain formalities factors, while a different jurisdiction focused on other factors, the 
results would differ. Yet courts are somehow arriving at the “correct” decisions.278 
Courts’ accuracy with respect to veil piercing decisions is no more apparent than 
in the context of tort claims where courts seem to find their way to the most equitable, 
fair decision, even though they often appear unconcerned by the vagueness of the 
doctrines they are formulating.279 The unifying piece in each tort case is not any one 
of the formalities factors, but the policy concerns, which, more often than not, find 
themselves sprinkled in the court’s reasoning.280 As commentators have noted, the 
court’s balancing of the underlying policies, not abstract factors determining 
corporate separateness, tend to be the best predictor of results.281 
Indeed, in the tort context, judicial decisions tend to corroborate this idea that 
equitable policy governs the courts’ end result.282 In Axtmann, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court was concerned about the tort creditor’s lack of choice in voluntarily 
interacting with the corporation, as well as the risk of loss being transferred to the 
public.283 For the Secon Service System, Inc. court, the focus was also on the 
voluntary nature of the plaintiff’s association with the corporation and the plaintiff’s 
ability to negotiate terms reflecting enhanced risks.284 The Seventh Circuit in 
Northbound Group, Inc. was concerned about the plaintiff’s inability to obtain 
compensation for increased risk and the opportunity to negotiate terms reflecting 
 
 275.  Michael, supra note 110, at 49 (quoting David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and 
Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1601 (1991)). 
 276.  See generally id. 
 277.  See supra Part III. 
 278.  See generally Macey & Mitts, supra note 23. 
 279.  Id. at 104. 
 280.  See generally Morris, supra note 89. 
 281.  See, e.g., id. at 275. 
 282.  See generally supra Part IV.A. 
 283.  See supra Part IV.A.1.a. 
 284.  See supra Part IV.A.1.b. 
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such increased risk.285 Finally, the Fourth Circuit in Perpetual Real Estate Services, 
Inc. similarly made its decision based upon the voluntary nature of the plaintiff’s 
interaction with the corporation.286 
The impact of these policy considerations cannot be underestimated. On paper, 
the judge may focus most of her time explaining whether the formalities factors have 
been satisfied, resulting in somewhat incoherent justifications for piercing the veil.287 
The truth, however, is that the judge’s main policy considerations (which might not 
necessarily be explicit in the opinion) direct the judge in deciding whether the given 
factors have been satisfied in a certain case, or as one commentator described, are a 
metaphorical means of stating the result itself.288 This makes sense, especially 
considering the equitable nature of the remedy and the fact that the decisions of 
equity judges typically have a “reasoned regularity.”289 
The tort creditor may have the strongest claim to the remedy, which is centered 
on equity and fairness. Tort creditors are supported by powerful arguments of non-
consent, lack of information, lack of choice, unequal bargaining power and the 
involuntary transfer of costs resulting from risky corporate behavior.290 These 
arguments make up the primary policy justification for piercing the veil in the tort 
context: tort victims should not be required to bear the costs of risky corporate 
behavior when they neither chose to deal with the corporation nor had the opportunity 
to protect themselves from the risk of corporate insolvency.291 
 
 
 285.  See supra Part IV.A.2.a. 
 286.  See supra Part IV.A.2.b. 
 287.  Macey & Mitts, supra note 23, at 103. 
 288.  Morris, supra note 89, at 288. 
 289.  Kennedy, supra note 42, at 614 (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON-LAW TRADITION: DECIDING 
APPEALS 216 (1960)). 
 290.  See generally id. 
 291.  This policy justification applies to involuntary tort creditors and is the strongest justification out of the 
involuntary creditors. See generally id. However, other involuntary creditors, such as trade creditors and 
employees, have policy justifications more persuasive than the otherwise contract creditor. Id. These other 
involuntary creditors should not be required to bear the costs of risky corporate behavior when they neither had 
the ability to obtain requisite information about the corporation’s solvency, nor had the ability to protect 
themselves from such risk by obtaining guarantees, security interests or adequate compensation before dealing 
with the corporation. Id. 
